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ABSTRACT. The use of living organisms to make or modify products is ancient. The 1980s brought wide-
spread use of novel genetic engineering techniques for modifying the hereditary characteristics of living
organisms. In response, rulemakers formed a federal biotechnology policy.
Articulated federal policy for biotechnology holds that existing laws, as currently implemented, address
regulatory needs adequately. The agencies that administer federal laws have found several significant laws to
be adequate. These are: The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), the Federal Plant Pest Act
(FPPA), the Plant Quarantine Act (PQA), and the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act (VST). The National Institutes of
Health's "Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules" have also set standards for
experimental containment and release.
Lawsuits brought by the Foundation on Economic Trends against federal agencies have sought to prevent
deliberate release experiments. These lawsuits have alleged violations of the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA). This act is a Federal procedural statute that all agencies must comply with unless their actions
are found to be functionally equivalent to the NEPA requirements.
This survey paper reviews federal agency publications, reported cases, newspaper articles, federal statutes,
federal regulations, and telephone conversations with key participants. The review covers only deliberate
release of genetically engineered products into the environment. It excludes product licensing by the Food and
Drug Administration. The following discussion first addresses federal regulations and policy to control
deliberate release experiments, and then reviews litigation initiated to prevent deliberate release experiments.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1975, leading scientists gathered at Pacific Grove,
California to discuss the safety of genetic engineering.
The first effective restriction enzymes had become avail-
able in 1970, through the work of H. Smith at Johns
Hopkins University. In 1973, Boyer and Cohen had an-
nounced the first universally effective method for making
recombinant DNA (Watson 1986). The Conference at
Pacific Grove reflected public concern that new, genet-
ically engineered life forms might threaten public health
or cause undesirable social changes.
The following year the National Institutes of Health
(NIH), through the Recombinant DNA Advisory Com-
mittee (RAC), began reviewing research protocols for
recombinant DNA (rDNA) experiments. The NIH
published safety standards in 1976 under the title
"Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA
Molecules" (NIH 1976). For roughly a decade, RAC
approval under the Guidelines functioned as the only
'Manuscript received 6 August 1987 and in revised form 9 October
1987 (#87-31).
review process that specifically addressed risks unique to
genetic engineering.
By the mid-1980s, federal regulation of biotechnology
activities had blossomed. In 1986, federal rulemakers
announced a revised comprehensive, interagency regula-
tory scheme for organisms and products created through
biotechnology. Articulated federal biotechnology policy
holds that existing laws, as currently implemented, ad-
dress regulatory needs adequately.
During the 1970s and 1980s, lawsuits to prevent de-
liberate release experiments also flourished. These suits
alleged violations of the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA). NEPA is a federal procedural statute which
requires federal agencies to assess the effects of their
proposed actions on the human environment and human
health.
DISCUSSION
FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND POLICY TO CONTROL
DELIBERATE RELEASE EXPERIMENTS. The National
Institutes of Health (NIH) has traditionally provided
financial support for basic biomedical research. Oversight
of biotechnology research is relatively new. The Re-
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combinant DNA Advisory Committee's legal jurisdic-
tion has always been limited to recombinant DNA
research at institutions that receive any support for
rDNA research from NIH. The NIH can penalize failure
to comply by withholding funds. It has never had
regulatory authority over projects conducted by most
commercial biotechnology firms, nor has it reviewed bio-
engineering techniques other than research involving
rDNA molecules. Despite the introduction into Congress
of bills that would have imposed the NIH Guidelines on
private industry, no such Federal statute was enacted
(Gore 1986).
Notwithstanding RAC's limited jurisdiction, it is
widely believed that from 1976 to the present most insti-
tutions performing rDNA research complied voluntarily
with the guidelines. By the mid-1980s, biotechnology
had emerged as a commercial force. Novel techniques for
modifying the genetics of living organisms, such as cell
fusion, hybridoma technology, and somatic cell culture
came into widespread use, often for purposes that were
ultimately commercial (Jaworski 1986). Public research
institutions and private firms developed products in-
tended for deliberate release into the environment. This
raised questions about the appropriate regulation.
By 1983, the RAC and NIH had approved three
government-sponsored applications for the deliberate re-
lease of rDNA products. One application submitted by
Drs. N. Panapoulos and S. Lindow at the University of
California proposed to test a gene-deleted, frost-
inhibiting bacterium. Dr. R. Davis of Stanford Univer-
sity requested approval to test corn plants with added
genes; Dr. J. Sanford of Cornell University wanted to
field-test tomato and tobacco plants transformed with
bacteria and yeast DNA. Litigation brought by the
Foundation on Economic Trends halted the field tests.
Congressional concern resulted in a hearing on 22 June
1983 by a Congressional Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions and Oversight. Albert Gore, Jr. chaired the hear-
ing. A resulting staff report was released in February,
1984 (Subcommittee 1983).
The Subcommittee found that federal agencies lacked
the expertise and experience to evaluate deliberate re-
leases of live, genetically engineered organisms. While
recognizing the leadership of the RAC, the staff report
urged greater involvement by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA). It suggested a General Accounting
Office (GAO) investigation of whether the Department
of Agriculture (USDA) should assume greater regulatory
responsibility. The RAC was urged to stop reviewing,
under its voluntary compliance policy, projects not get-
ting NIH funds. The subcommittee also recommended
an interagency panel to facilitate cooperation among fed-
eral agencies. It recommended the inclusion of experts
specifically trained in ecology and environmental science
on review committees within the NIH and USDA (Sub-
committee 1984). The USDA's review committee had
not then assumed regulatory duties.
In 1984, the Cabinet Council on Natural Resources
and the Environment formed an interagency working
group. On 31 December 1984, the working group pub-
lished in the Federal Register a 51-page proposal, with
contributions from four federal agencies. The U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA), the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), and the Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP) published policy statements. A 28-page
matrix addressed statutory jurisdiction among the agen-
cies for every imaginable product at every commercial
stage, from the research laboratory to final distribution
and disposal. This occurred at a time when not one
product of the new bioengineering was ready for licens-
ing. The voluminous interagency document formed the
basic structure for emerging biotechnology regulation
(OSTP 1984).
On 14 November 1985, the Office of Science and
Technology Policy published a revised "Coordinated
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology." This docu-
ment responded to public comment in accordance with
the notice and comment provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act. It also established the Biotechnology Sci-
ence Coordinating Committee (BSCC). This interagency
committee included senior representatives from agencies
involved in biotechnology regulation. The BSCC does
not conduct any second-level review of applications under
consideration by the federal agencies. Instead its charter
stresses interagency coordination and information shar-
ing (OSTP 1985).
In the spring of 1986, the GAO published results of
its requested investigation of USDA review procedures.
It characterized the USDA's review procedure as confused
and disorganized. The GAO found that the rDNA review
committee for agriculture had almost no authority, met
infrequently, had no budget, and could express no clear
mission (Hilts 1986).
The Office of Science and Technology Policy published
a third, revised "Coordinated Framework for Regulation
of Biotechnology" in June, 1986. Within this document
some agencies modified policy positions. The publication
reflected efforts of the newly formed, interagency Bio-
technology Science Coordinating Committee (BSCC) to
clarify statutory definitions and achieve uniform levels of
review among agencies. Most important, the publication
endorsed previously articulated federal biotechnology
policy: that existing laws, as currently implemented,
address regulatory needs adequately. The regulatory
scheme, as previously announced, assigned responsibility
among the traditional, existing agencies according to
product use (OSTP 1986).
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) would li-
cense new drugs and biologies for human use, new animal
drugs, and new medical devices created through bio-
technology. Should new products of biotechnology be
marketed as food, the FDA would maintain its tradi-
tional regulatory duties (FDA 1986). The agency would
apply established regulations promulgated under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. These regu-
lations require proof of safety and efficacy (FDA 1986).
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would
regulate live microbial products used as pesticides, under
authority granted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). The EPA would regulate
genetically engineered microorganisms used for commer-
cial purposes under the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA). Under authority granted by these and other acts,
the EPA would monitor all stages of product devel-
opment from field tests through final disposal.
Excepted from EPA control were non-pesticidal, live
microbial products intended only for agricultural use.
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These would fall under USDA jurisdiction. The USDA
and EPA would share information on releases of a few
kinds of microorganisms that fall within the statutory
mandate of both agencies (EPA 1986).
The USDA, through its Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS), would regulate the intro-
duction of any genetically engineered organism or prod-
uct that is or may reasonably be a plant pest. Authority
would spring from the Federal Plant Pest Act (FPPA) and
the Plant Quarantine Act (PQA). New regulations be-
came effective in July, 1987. These are the first final
regulations exclusively addressing biotechnology. The
USDA would also continue to license genetically en-
gineered veterinary biologies such as the pseudorabies
vaccine under the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act (USDA 1986).
The NIH would fund and approve biomedical experi-
ments which come under its Guidelines. Authority
would be limited to institutions receiving NIH support
for rDNA research. The NIH would also continue to
review proposals submitted voluntarily by private firms,
but would address only those proposals that fall outside
the authority of any federal agency (NIH 1986).
The NIH review procedures have provided a model for
other agencies. With the June, 1986 policy statement,
the USDA Cooperative State Research Service published
a "Notice of Intent to Propose Research Guidelines." The
first draft emulated the NIH Guidelines but covered
other genetic engineering techniques in addition to
rDNA research. It applied to federally funded agricul-
tural research not supported and regulated by another
federal agency (USDA 1986b).
Subsequently, regulators from several agencies ini-
tiated an effort to have qnly one set of federal research
guidelines. As a result, the upcoming revised NIH
Guidelines should contain some provisions for whole
plants and animals. The USDA may then publish a "Part
II" for agricultural research, which would deal with bio-
engineering research other than rDNA experiments and
would cover the entire spectrum of living organisms.
According to Dr. D. Jones (pers. comm.) at USDA/
OAB, this unified approach would minimize conflicts
created from applying two similar, but different, sets
of guidelines. Access to a unified set of guidelines is
important for institutions funded by both the NIH and
the USDA.
The evolution of the NIH guidelines reflects growing
experience with rDNA regulation. The original guide-
lines, published in 1976, outlined laboratory contain-
ment procedures only (NIH 1976). Deliberate release of
organisms containing rDNA was not permitted. Cur-
rently, the Guidelines classify experiments according to
biosafety level. Deliberate release of an organism contain-
ing rDNA is a Class III-A experiment, requiring RAC
review, specific NIH approval, and publication in the
Federal Register. The Guidelines also include, however,
Class III-D experiments. These are exempt even from
approval by Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBC) at
the research institution level (NIH 1986). Many rDNA
plant applications now fall into this category, but may
require APHIS approval if they are deemed regulated
articles and are introduced under terms of the regulation.
Today's guidelines require each research institution to
support or affiliate with a committee of experts that will
review projects at the institution's level. Every Institu-
tional Biosafety Committee (IBC) must include experts
in rDNA technology, containment, and biological safety.
Each IBC must consult with persons who know about
institutional commitments and policies, applicable law,
professional standards, community attitudes, and the en-
vironment. At least one member must be from a labora-
tory technical staff. For experiments other than Class
III-A, the IBC can provide the only review. The NIH
encourages public IBC meetings and open commu-
nication with local communities. The public can obtain
minutes of IBC meetings upon request (NIH 1986).
THE FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND
RODENTICIDE ACT (FIFRA). The Environmental Pro-
tection Agency assumed regulation of genetically en-
gineered microbial releases in 1984 (EPA 1984). The
EPA's authority rested on a federal statute that granted
authority to regulate products used as pesticides. This
was the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA) as amended in 1972. This act broadly de-
fined the term "pesticide" as "any substance or
mixture . . . intended for preventing, destroying, repel-
ling, or mitigating any pest, and . . . intended for use as
a plant regulant, defoliant, or dessicant" (FIFRA 1972).
Regulators started treating frost-inhibiting bacteria and
similar products as microbial pesticides.
The Federal government registered the first microbial
pesticide, Bacillus popilliae, in 1948. It was not until
1984 that the EPA promulgated regulations on microbial
pesticides (CFRb). The agency has applied them to
genetically engineered microorganisms used as pes-
ticides, as well as to non-engineered ones (EPA 1986).
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act gives the EPA authority over the distribution, sale,
and use of pesticide products. It also operates as a regis-
tration statute. No one can market a pesticide commer-
cially until it is registered with the EPA under FIFRA.
The Environmental Protection Agency supervises pre-
registration activities through an Experimental Use
Permit (EUP) system. The producer of a live microbial
pesticide submits data to the Agency. After reviewing
the data the Agency may issue an Experimental Use
Permit. At the Agency's discretion, the application for an
EUP or the application for final registration can result in
public notice. This occurs by publication in the Federal
Register (CFRc).
Traditionally, many small-scale field tests were ex-
empted from obtaining EUPs. A small-scale test involves
environmental application on 10 acres or less of land or
1 surface acre or less of water. In 1985, the EPA an-
nounced an Interim Policy that imposed higher pre-
registration scrutiny for small-scale field tests of micro-
bial pesticides. The Agency clarified this policy in 1986.
Currently, even small-scale field tests of deliberately
created intergeneric microorganisms require EPA noti-
fication and review. The same is true for deliberately
created intrageneric ones with pathogenic source organ-
isms. Intergeneric refers to those products containing
genetic material from source and recipient organisms of
different genera. All non-indigenous microorganisms, as
well, will face the new data submission requirements.
The EPA contends that these types of microorganisms
may behave unpredictably in the environment. It will
revise EUP regulations accordingly. Excepted from the
Interim Policy are intergeneric microorganisms created
Ohio J. Science REGULATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS 177
from different genera, where only well-characterized,
non-coding regulatory regions are transferred (EPA
1986).
To date, several tests of microbial pesticides in the
field have occurred under FIFRA. The Monsanto Com-
pany asked to test in the field a genetically engineered
bacterium that would, it was hoped, repel rootworms.
The Agency requested further tests which the company
has not submitted. The EPA granted Advanced Genetic
Science's application to test frost-inhibiting bacteria in
the field, and then revoked permission when officials
discovered that scientists had tested the bacteria under
tree bark on a rooftop. After paying a fine, the company
again gained EPA approval and conducted field tests. Dr.
S. Lindow's much delayed field test of frost-inhibiting
bacteria took place in the spring of 1987.
T H E TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (TSCA).
Clearly, many genetically altered microbes and the like
can never fall under FIFRA's qualifier "used as a pes-
ticide". Recognizing this, the EPA now regulates many
microorganisms as new chemicals under Section 5 of the
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). These include
microorganisms that will be used to degrade toxic pol-
lutants, leach minerals, enhance oil recovery, and pro-
duce industrial chemicals (EPA 1986). Congress enacted
TSCA in 1976 to correct the then uneven and piecemeal
regulation of chemicals believed to be toxic (Congres-
sional Advice and News 1976). The statute covers those
chemicals that are unreasonably risky to human health or
the environment.
Substances and mixtures intended for commercial use
are regulated by TSCA. The EPA has interpreted the
terms "substances and mixtures" to include organic sub-
stances. This brings DNA molecules, other nucleic acids,
and constituents of cells into the agency's jurisdiction
under TSCA (EPA 1984). The statute specifically ex-
empts all pesticides, tobacco products, nuclear materials,
feeds, food additives, drugs and cosmetics (TSCA 1976).
The Toxic Substances Control Act operates through a
published chemical substances inventory. The initial in-
ventory of all chemicals manufactured or processed in the
United States consisted of some 43,000 substances (EPA
1979). Detailed testing of the now over 60,000 listed
chemicals would be impossible. However, TSCA requires
the EPA to set test rules for those chemicals that may
present an unreasonable risk to human health and the
environment. A priority list, revised every 6 months,
contains 50 or fewer selected chemical substances. With-
in 12 months of the listing of a chemical on the priority
list, the Agency must start writing a test rule or explain
publicly why it has not done so.
All new chemicals and all new uses of old (listed)
chemicals undergo EPA scrutiny under TSCA before
manufacture or importation commences. At least 90 days
before importing or commencing manufacture of a new
chemical, its manufacturer or distributor must file a Pre-
manufacture Notification (PMN). Section 5 of TSCA
establishes this statutory requirement. The PMN must
include data sufficient for the EPA to decide whether the
substance presents an unreasonable risk of injury to
human health or the environment (TSCA 1976).
Naturally occurring chemicals have traditionally en-
joyed exemption from the PMN requirements, even
though they are unlisted on the inventory. The reporting
rules have always distinguished new from naturally oc-
curring chemicals according to the level of human inter-
vention (CFRd). One of the most criticized aspects of the
EPA's December, 1984 policy statement was its applica-
tion of this principle to live microorganisms. The agency
articulated a "process" approach, justified by the lack
of distinct taxonomic categories for microorganisms
(EPA 1984).
The EPA attempted to list processes that would man-
date full agency review. These included in vitro synthesis,
rDNA, rRNA, and cell fusion. The agency took no posi-
tion regarding transformation, transduction, trans-
fection, promotion of plasmid transfer and conjugation,
and undirected mutagenesis (EPA 1984). Distinguishing
new from naturally occurring microorganisms according
to the process by which they were developed produced
inconsistent results. The manufacture of a chemical sub-
stance through modern biotechnology triggered height-
ened review, even where the identical microorganism
existed in nature.
In its June, 1986 policy statement, the EPA de-
emphasized the degree of human intervention as a test for
newness of a chemical. The agency now considers the
following to be new chemical substances: microorgan-
isms deliberately formed to contain genetic material from
different genera, except where only well-characterized,
non-coding, regulatory regions are transferred. Intra-
generic and non-engineered microbes will be considered
naturally occurring (EPA 1986).
The EPA acknowledged a category of living organisms
which, although not new, should also receive a high level
of scrutiny. These are genetically engineered, inter-
generic or even intra-generic microorganisms that are
pathogenic or contain genetic material from pathogens.
Any release of these chemical substances into the environ-
ment will be considered a significant new use, subject to
full review under TSCA. The notification requirements
are similar to those for new chemicals.
It is widely believed that no genetically engineered
products that fall under TSCA have progressed beyond
research and development. Under the statute, chemical
substances manufactured in small quantities solely for
research and development have traditionally enjoyed an
exemption from Premanufacture Notification. In 1986,
the EPA expressed an intention to narrow this exemp-
tion. It published a statement that limited exposure and
limited risk should not be assumed for any field-tests of
living organisms. Amended regulations will probably
specify that, for the research and development exemp-
tion, many field-tests of microorganisms should fall
outside the statutory definition of small quantities
(EPA 1986).
Until new regulations are published, commercial re-
searchers intending to release new, living organisms must
report prior to commencing activities. The same is true
for commercial researchers planning to release many
genetically engineered pathogens. Purely noncommercial
research and development would retain its exemption
from Premanufacture Notification.
To date the EPA has permitted no open release of live
microorganisms treated as chemicals subject to TSCA.
However, the agency is currently in the process of re-
viewing a nitrogen-fixing product developed by Bio-
technica. This is Rhizobium meliloti, a nitrogen-fixing
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microorganism to be tested on alfalfa. Scientists have
added another gene from the R. meliloti itself, making
this an intrageneric organism under the EPA definitions.
It is inescapably true that many non-engineered com-
mercial chemicals that are quite dangerous escape regu-
lation by the EPA. Currently, the chemical substances
inventory, which lists chemicals already in production,
includes over 60,000 chemicals. The agency lacks the
resources to even select those chemicals that should un-
dergo testing. As of January, 1985, it had taken action
to regulate existing chemicals on only six occasions since
TSCA was enacted (Florio 1985).
Notwithstanding the existing toxic chemicals prob-
lem, public concern has caused the agency to focus on
new biotechnology products. The policy will be to scru-
tinize microorganisms used in the environment which
may be pathogenic or which may contain new combina-
tions of traits. The EPA is currently replacing its sci-
entific advisory panels with a formal Scientific Advisory
Committee for Biotechnology. This group will consist of
members of the lay public and independent scientists,
and will review scientific proposals submitted under
all EPA statutes. It will also oversee biotechnology
regulations.
THE FEDERAL PLANT PEST ACT AND PLANT QUAR-
ANTINE ACT (FPPA). The USDA's Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has promulgated the
first final rule that exclusively governs biotechnology
products. The new regulations, which control genetically
engineered organisms and products that are plant
pests, became effective on 16 June 1987. The final regu-
lations also control genetically engineered organisms and
products which administrators have reason to believe are
plant pests. The regulations apply only to the intro-
duction of these organisms. Introduction, as used within
the final rule, refers to importation, interstate move-
ment, or environmental release (CFRe).
The Federal Plant Pest Act (FPPA) defines plant pest
as any of a variety of listed life forms "which can directly
or indirectly injure or cause disease or damage in any
plants or parts thereof, or any processed, manufactured or
other products of plants" (FPPA 1957). Federal regu-
lations delegate actual regulation under the Act to the
Deputy Administrator of the Plant Protection and Quar-
antine Program, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (USDA 1987).
The Federal Plant Pest Act does not expressly autho-
rize regulation of environmental releases. Its terms cover
only importation and interstate movement (USDA
1987). Nevertheless, the new final regulations contain
provisions requiring a permit prior to release into the
environment of certain genetically engineered organ-
isms, or of products containing such organisms (CFRe).
USDA attorneys maintain that the new deliberate release
provisions constitute a reasonable construction of the
USDA's statutory responsibilities. This position is
strengthened by the broad grants of authority contained
in the Plant Quarantine Act (USDA 1987).
The new final rule for biotechnology applies only to
those genetically engineered organisms that are deemed
"regulated articles." It defines regulated articles with
reference to a list of all genera or taxa that may contain
plant pests. Determination of whether a genetically
engineered product is a regulated article is a two-step
process. The first test is whether the donor organism,
recipient organism, vector, or vector agent belongs to any
listed genus or taxon. Second, within any listed genus or
taxon, only those organisms that meet the regulatory
definition of plant pest are regulated articles.
Where the first test is met, unclassified organisms and
those for which classification is unknown can also trigger
regulated article status. The same is true for products
containing plant pests, and for any other organisms or
products which the Deputy Administrator determines or
has reason to believe are plant pests. Excluded from the
definition of regulated articles are recipient micro-
organisms that are not plant pests and that have resulted
from the addition of genetic material from a donor
organism, where the material is well characterized and
contains only non-coding, regulatory regions (CFRe).
Interstate movement or importation of a regulated
article requires a limited permit, obtained in advance.
Generally the regulations require the USDA to complete
its review 60 days after receiving the completed applica-
tion. For interstate movement only, the responsible per-
son can apply for a limited permit valid for the movement
of multiple articles, and can also apply for a limited
permit valid for multiple destinations. These permits are
good for 1 year.
Applications for release into the environment involve
a 120-day maximum review period. This reflects the
necessity to conduct an environmental assessment prior
to the issuance of such a permit. The application itself
requires submission of data on the identity of the donor
organism, recipient organism, and vector or vector
agent. Additionally, the application requires a descrip-
tion of how the genetically altered material in the
regulated article differs from that in the non-modified,
parent organism. The responsible person must describe
purpose, quantity, location and procedural safeguards for
the planned field test. The USDA estimates the in-house
cost for each application for release at $5,000 (CFRe).
For all permit applications, state notification is an
integral part of the review process. Standard permit con-
ditions can be supplemented by APHIS, where appropri-
ate. The Biological Assessment Support Staff (Biotech
Unit) of APHIS is now in place and has begun taking
permit applications under the final regulations.
THE VIRUS-SERUM-TOXIN ACT (VST). The USDA's
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)
regulates, among other things, the field testing and
licensing of animal biological products. Authority
springs from the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act of 1913 (VST
1913). This statute requires licensing for any virus,
serum, toxin, or analogous product intended for use in
the treatment of domestic animals. Under the statute no
license shall be issued unless the product was prepared in
compliance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary
of Agriculture (VST 1913).
The USDA has enunciated what it will consider an
animal biologic. A federal regulation defines the term to
include "all viruses, serums, toxins, and analogous prod-
ucts of natural or synthetic origin . . . intended for use in
the diagnosis, treatment, or prevention of disease in
animals (CFRa). This language covers genetically en-
gineered, live viruses such as the one in the controversial
genetically modified pseudorabies vaccine (USDA 1986).
The Virus-Serum-Toxin Act prohibits licensing of
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worthless, contaminated, dangerous, or harmful prod-
ucts. The USDA has therefore promulgated regulations
to measure purity, safety, potency, and efficacy. Its per-
mit system involves well established tests. Producers
submit a detailed outline of production. The relevant
master seed, primary cells, and cell line undergo testing.
Genetic stability and purity must be established even
for non-engineered entities. Host animal studies supple-
ment laboratory tests to measure safety, potency, and
efficacy (CFRa).
A controversial licensing action under the Virus-
Serum-Toxin Act occurred in the spring of 1986. This
concerned the gene-deleted pseudorabies vaccine devel-
oped by Biologies Corporation of Omaha, Nebraska. Ac-
cording to M. Bartkoski (pers. coram.), Vice President of
Operations, the company conducted extensive field tests
in cooperation with the USDA and state veterinary au-
thorities. After laboratory and field tests, APHIS granted
the license to market the product.
The Foundation on Economic Trends challenged the
USDA's actions in federal courts. The Foundation's first
claim arose under the Administrative Procedure Act. For
most licensing, a federal agency must demonstrate in the
record that it used reasoned decision-making. The Foun-
dation claimed that the USDA ignored its own policies
in licensing the modified pseudorabies vaccine. This,
according to E. Rogers (pers. comm.), attorney for
the Foundation, constituted arbitrary and capricious
decision-making.
Specifically, the Foundation alleged existence of a pub-
lished USDA policy for all research involving re-
combinant DNA molecules. Allegedly, the USDA's own
policy was to withhold licensing where an applicant
failed to comply with the NIH Guidelines for Research.
The Foundation relied on USDA statements in the
Federal Register that all research involving recombinant
DNA must meet the NIH guidelines.
The USDA insisted that review channels depended
completely on the type of genetic engineering used to
develop the vaccine. According to Dr. D. Espeseth (pers.
comm.), Chief Staff Veterinarian at USD A-APHIS-VS,
the modified virus was not a true recombinant organism
because no new genetic material was added to it. The
vaccine was derived by using rDNA techniques to delete
a Thymidine kinase gene. This category of products was
exempt from the policy which might have imposed NIH
guidelines. Several members of the Agriculture Recomb-
inant DNA Research Committee disagreed with this
official position (Schneider 1986).
The USDA held that the relevant issue was whether
the agency complied with regulations under the Virus-
Serum-Toxin Act (VST) for ensuring purity, safety, po-
tency, and efficacy. The agency asserted that rigorous
testing had established, according to regulations, those
qualities. Tests on laboratory animals, host animals, and
other animals compared the new virus with its parent.
The altered virus, as intended, proved less virulent. The
pseudorabies vaccine was the first product of its kind to
undergo licensing under VST, because it contained a
living virus with a single gene deleted. However, the
USDA claimed considerable experience regulating non-
engineered vaccines containing naturally occurring live
viruses. In addition, the agency had granted 12 licenses
for genetically engineered biologies. All of these licenses
had involved inactive or killed viruses and organisms.
The pseudorabies litigation, including a second claim
discussed below, is ongoing. During the pendency of
litigation, administrative review channels within the
agency appear to have clarified. Currently, the Veterinary
Services Biotechnology Committee for the Veterinary
Services branch of the USDA provides advice and council
to the Deputy Administrator concerning the approval of
environmental assessments and pending releases. This is
true for all genetically engineered veterinary biologies.
The agency-wide Recombinant DNA Research Commit-
tee approves research projects only (D. Espeseth pers.
comm.). The vaccine has been marketed under the brand
name "Omnivac " with no reported problems.
The Virus-Serum-Toxin Act originally governed only
the interstate shipment and importation of products in-
tended for use in domestic animals. Recent amendments
contained in the Food Security Act of 1985 have extended
this authority to products shipped intrastate and ex-
ported (USDA 1986).
L I T I G A T I O N TO PREVENT DELIBERATE RELEASE
EXPERIMENTS. Deliberate release of a new organism
involves the grandfather of environmental statutes, The
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA 1969). This
statute, passed in 1969, proclaimed a national policy to
pursue harmony between man and nature and called upon
all federal agencies to cooperate toward this end. Prior to
NEPA some federal agencies had claimed that their en-
abling statutes granted no authority in environmental
matters (NEPA 1969).
The National Environmental Policy Act requires fed-
eral agencies to weigh the environmental consequences of
all major actions that significantly affect the human envi-
ronment by compiling an Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS). An EIS is a document containing detailed
descriptions of expected environmental or human health
effects of undertaking a particular alternative. Com-
pilation of an EIS can take several years. It must set out
all known risks from the federal action and must describe
alternative actions (NEPA 1969). The EPA monitors
compliance. Each week the EPA publishes a notice in the
Federal Register of all EISs received. The public, other
agencies, and higher level agency officials can review the
document upon request. The agency wanting to take
action can make no decision until the required time for
comment has expired.
The National Environmental Policy Act requires a full
EIS only for major federal actions having a significant
effect on the human environment or human health
(NEPA 1969). For actions that are not categorically ex-
cluded, federal agencies must employ an abbreviated re-
view called an Environmental Assessment (EA). An EA
determines whether the potential impact of a proposed
alternative is so great that an EIS must be written. The
EA may result in a finding of no significant impact on
human health or the environment. In that event the
proposed action may proceed immediately.
Like the more comprehensive analysis, an EA is
supposed to be a public document (CFRf). The delay
associated with an EA can be quite short for new bio-
technology products. According to M. Bartkoski (pers.
comm.) of Biologies Corporation, an EA can be assem-
bled in several weeks. Instead of having to start from
scratch, the staff can assemble data from tests already
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conducted. It is important to note that the public must
have access to the EA upon request. The USDA's Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service, for instance, pub-
lishes the availability of the EA 30 days prior to the
commencement of field testing.
It is well established that federal regulating and licens-
ing can constitute major federal action. Determination of
whether a biotechnology project results in significant risk
to human health or the environment is more difficult. If
the resulting life form is new, regulators lack a broad data
base. Scientists must compare survivability and other
behavior of the modified life form with that of the parent.
In 1984, EPA scientists articulated the view that mod-
ern biotechnology techniques increase the risk of creating
a broader host range, a new toxin, enhanced virulence,
greater survivability, or greater competitiveness. Fur-
ther, even if experts could perfectly predict the behavior
of new life forms, they lack methods to predict the ulti-
mate effect on the ecosystem (EPA 1984). This has never
been the position of the USDA, which has stated that it
does not believe most genetically engineered products
will differ significantly from conventionally produced
products (USDA 1984).
Early litigation involved the failure of federal agencies
to conduct adequate EAs under NEPA. Two of the first
three field tests approved by the Recombinant DNA
Advisory Committee (RAC) involved plants. Pre-
sumably, these experiments eventually went forward
under revised guidelines. The third, the field test of a
frost-inhibiting bacterium, became ensnared in litigation
involving the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA
1969). Dr. S. Lindow and his colleagues at the University
of California at Berkeley had developed the bacterium. In
1984, environmental activist J. Rifkin, with the Founda-
tion on Economic Trends and others, brought a lawsuit
that halted small scale field-tests.
In federal court, the plaintiffs alleged that the NIH
had failed to perform an adequate EA on the Lindow
experiment. Plaintiffs also alleged that a programmatic
EIS was needed on the NIH decision to allow deliberate
release experiments on a case-by-case basis. The U.S.
District Court Judge issued a preliminary injunction
against the Lindow experiment. The Court also pro-
hibited the NIH from approving more field tests until
a programmatic EIS was completed. In 1985, the U.S.
Court of Appeals upheld the injunction regarding the
Lindow experiment. The Court of Appeals based its deci-
sion on the absence from the record of any formal EA,
deeming the RAC review procedurally inadequate. How-
ever, the Court of Appeals lifted the injunction against all
NIH approval of deliberate release experiments (Founda-
tion on Economic Trends v. Heckler 1984).
Because the RAC lacks jurisdiction over private
companies not receiving NIH funds, the federal injunc-
tion specifically exempted private firms. Nevertheless,
it is believed that two other firms, Cetus Madison
and Biotechnica, voluntarily suspended their proposed
field tests.
The Foundation on Economic Trends again charged
noncompliance with NEPA as its second claim in the
suit against the USDA over the pseudorabies vaccine
(discussed earlier). Like the NIH, the USDA enjoys
no exemption from NEPA. Therefore, the USDA must
prepare an EA on its actions that are not categori-
cally excluded.
The Foundation questioned the adequacy of contain-
ment measures for live viral vaccines, and maintained
that injection into animals constituted a release into the
environment (E. Rogers pers. comm.). The USDA has al-
ways contended that in normal husbandry and laboratory
practices, veterinary biological products are not consid-
ered released into the environment. The USDA sus-
pended the license for 2 weeks, however, while an EA
was prepared. This document contained a finding of no
significant impact; subsequently, the vaccine was mar-
keted under the name "Omnivac."
Litigation continues regarding the licensing of the
pseudorabies vaccine; arguments are ongoing. In the in-
terim, the USDA has approved field trials of a second
live, viral vaccine. This product has two genes deleted.
For the second product USDA conducted an EA. Notice
in the Federal Register asserted no significant impact on
human health or the environment. Field tests of this
product remain unchallenged.
Mr. J. Rifkin and The Foundation on Economic
Trends have alleged NEPA violations in several other
lawsuits concerning modern biotechnology. In 1985, Re-
tired Admiral G. La Rocque and Major General W. Fair-
born (USMC RET) joined the Foundation in suing the
Department of Defense. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin
construction of a biological test laboratory which would
house aerosol experiments. In 1985, the plaintiffs ob-
tained a permanent injunction, based on inadequacy of
the EA. The defendants are now conducting a full envi-
ronmental assessment. Mr. Rifkin and the Foundation
filed suit against the FDA to require an EIS for Bovine
Growth Hormone (Foundation 1986). This litigation
is ongoing.
The USDA has on several occasions conducted an EA
after suit by Mr. Rifkin and the Foundation. One suit
alleged negligence as well as NEPA violations regarding
USDA management of the gene bank program (Founda-
tion 1985a). Another complaint, still under litigation,
attacked licensing procedures for a genetically engineered
pseudorabies vaccine (New York Times 1986).
One criticism of NEPA is that it can become a per-
functory requirement. Frequently, a lawsuit brought
under NEPA serves to delay, but not change, federal
action. The statute by its terms requires only investi-
gation and consideration of a project's expected impact.
Decision-making remains with the federal agency.
Where a private firm has applied for federal licensing,
that firm will usually provide the data necessary for an
EA. Undeniably, experts hired by the government or by
private industry have an economic incentive not to under-
mine their employers. The agency will often conduct an
EA in order to comply with NEPA and subsequently will
proceed with the project.
The National Environmental Policy Act is a federal
procedural statute that requires compliance by all agen-
cies, unless their actions are found to be functionally
equivalent to the NEPA requirements. Actions by the
Environmental Protection Agency itself do not require
publication of an EIS. This implied exemption recognizes
the EPA's regulatory and statutory mission to protect the
environment.
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CONCLUSIONS
Representative J . J . Florio, at a Brookings Institute
Conference, has called the federal biotechnology policy
"sham regulation" which will lull the public into a false
sense of security. According to Mr. Florio, the EPA is
already burdened with obligations exceeding its re-
sources, and, even if biotechnology products are ex-
cluded, has failed to cure the toxic chemicals problem in
the United States (Florio 1985). The latter comment is
probably unfair because the toxic chemicals crisis de-
veloped before the EPA got jurisdiction under TSCA
and other statutes. In contrast, regulators have been
involved from the outset in monitoring novel products
of biotechnology.
A second criticism has been leveled at federal bio-
technology policies by scientists involved in basic re-
search. The scientists complain that regulation interrupts
their research projects capriciously and unnecessarily,
even where risk is low, and potential for human progress
is high. This has been a valid criticism, particularly for
early projects. Additionally, many scientists have ques-
tioned the scientific basis for regulating genetically en-
gineered products any differently from identical products
created through traditional means.
With their unified policy statements, existing federal
agencies have attempted to establish regular review chan-
nels to expedite federal evaluation. The federal review
process is unpopular with scientists, often under-
standably so. However, most scientists agree that federal
control is preferable to a patchwork of state and local
policies that would almost certainly result in the absence
of federal action. The alternative of creating a new federal
bureaucracy to approve all biotechnology products is un-
workable, and has never been seriously considered. Bio-
technology products are too diverse for such a solution.
Release of genetically engineered microorganisms into
the environment raises several valid concerns. Their abil-
ity to mutate quickly in nature and to multiply rapidly
under favorable conditions distinguishes them from other
organisms. This, together with the already over-
whelming problems concerning traditional commercial
chemicals, suggests that the largest portion of new dol-
lars for environmental regulation ought to support EPA
activities under TSCA. In addition, APHIS now regu-
lates many genetically engineered microorganisms that
are or may be plant pests. These activities also demand
adequate funding.
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